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Abstract
We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions,
both for the case where the set of alternatives is finite and where it is
infinite. Such power indices make it possible to take the issues under
consideration into account, in contrast to power indices defined just for
simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We
also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for
spatial political games.
Keywords: Effectivity Function, Power Index
JEL classification: C71
1 Introduction
A power index is a tool to measure and compare the power of players in political
and economic situations. In a democratic Parliament the number of seats of a
political party is a poor indication of its power. Rather, a measure of power
should be based on the likelihood that such a party is decisive. One way to assess
this is to model Parliament as a simple game, by establishing which coalitions
of political parties are winning and which are losing – based on the required
majorities to pass bills or amendments. To such a simple game one may then
apply a power index, for instance the Banzhaf-Coleman index or Shapley-Shubik
index (see for instance Bertini et al., 2013, for a recent overview).
Similarly, economic situations as for instance financial and corporate governance
structures may be modelled by simple games, and power indices may be applied
in order to obtain some indication of the real influence of firms or investment
companies in such situations (Crama and Leruth, 2007, 2013; Karos and Peters,
2015).
This approach to power measurement clearly has its limitations. In political
situations, neither the position of a political party nor the issues at stake are
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taken into consideration. For this reason, in political science spatial models are
considered, which enable to represent both a party’s position and the issues
involved.
In the present paper we generalize the simple game approach and also the spatial
game approach by considering the very broad model of an effectivity function
(Moulin and Peleg, 1982) and developing a theory of power indices for such func-
tions. Given a number of players and a set of alternatives, an effectivity function
assigns to each coalition (subset of players) a collection of sets of alternatives.
If a coalition S is effective for a set B of alternatives, then this is generally
interpreted as the coalition S being able to guarantee that the final alternative
is in B. Alternatives could be social states, and a coalition may be constitu-
tionally entitled to the final social state being in a certain set of social states.
Or alternatives could be laws, and a coalition of parties may have the power
(e.g., because it has a certain majority) to pass certain laws. In financial or
governance structures, coalitions of shareholders may enforce certain decisions
within companies if they own sufficiently many shares. More formally, effectiv-
ity functions may be derived from social choice functions or correspondences, or
from game forms.
The following is a specific political example, which will recur at several places
in this paper.
Example 1.1 (The US Legislative Process). In US legislation any bill must
be passed both by the Senate (100 members) and the House (of Representa-
tives, 435 members) and signed by the President before it comes to law. If the
President vetoes the bill, the Congress can override this decision by a two third
majority. In case of an Executive Order by the President, no approval by the
Congress is needed.
The President can agree on international treaties, but these must be approved
by a two third majority of the Senate. In case of Congressional-executive Agree-
ments (agreements that affect domestic policies, such as free trade agreements)
a simple majority approval both in the Senate and in the House are necessary;
and Executive Agreements need no approval by the Congress at all.
Currently, the Republicans have a majority in both chambers of the Congress,
but they do not have a two third majority. If we consider the Republicans
(R) and the Democrats (D) as one player each, we see that the singleton set
{D} is effective for any outcome that can be reached via Executive Orders or
Agreements, while {R} is not effective for anything.
Alternatively, we can analyze the situation from the individuals’ points view. In
this case the singleton {p} which contains only the president, is effective for any
outcome that can be reached via Executive Orders or Agreements; a coalition
S is effective for an outcome {a} that can be reached via a domestic law or a
Congressional-executive Agreement if S contains p and more than half of the
members of the Senate and of the House. In the first case it is also sufficient if S
contains more than two thirds of the members of the Senate and of the House.
In particular, a coalition T is effective for the set A\{a} – in other words, T can
veto a – if p ∈ T and, in case of a domestic law, T contains more than one third
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of the members of either the Senate or the House. If a is an international treaty
then S is effective for {a} if p ∈ S and S contains two thirds of the members of
the Senate.
Effectivity functions and the concept of a power index for effectivity functions
are introduced in Section 2. Our basic axioms for power indices are introduced
in Section 3: the Transfer Property, Anonymity, and (Strong) Monotonicity.
The Transfer Property is a generalized additivity condition which enables us
to unravel an effectivity function in terms of elementary effectivity functions
which are much easier to analyze. Anonymity and Monotonicity are natural
conditions in this context. In Section 4 we consider the case where the set of
alternatives is finite and characterize all power indices satisfying the Transfer
Property, Anonymity, and Monotonicity. Such a power index works as follows.
For each set of alternatives, consider the simple game in which exactly those
coalitions that are effective for that set of alternatives are winning. Also, to
each set of alternatives attach a non-negative number such that these numbers
sum up to one. Then the power index is obtained by taking the sum of the
Shapley values of these simple games weighted by the chosen numbers. This
leaves much freedom, namely in choosing these weights. In the remainder of
Section 4 we (1) show that all these power indices reduce to the Shapley value
for an effectivity function associated with a simple game (winning coalitions are
effective for every set of alternatives, losing coalitions only for the whole set);
(2) establish connections between power indices for the duals of simple games
and polar effectivity functions (which describe what coalitions can obtain in
reaction to outside players); (3) show that a power index is neutral if and only
if the weights only depend on the cardinalities of the sets of alternatives; (4)
show that requiring Strong Monotonicity results in non-singleton nontrivial sets
of alternatives having weight zero; and (5) consider the role of null-players. In
Section 5 we extend our main characterization to effectivity functions for an
infinite set of alternatives, under Strong Monotonicity instead of Monotonicity
and, additionally a Null Player axiom and a continuity condition. Basically,
we obtain a similar characterization, now with the weights of the finite case
replaced by a probability measure over the set of alternatives. In a separate
subsection, we show how this approach can lead to developing power indices
for spatial political models, similar in spirit to the Owen-Shapley spatial power
index.
In an Appendix we show that the axioms in our main characterization are
logically independent.
2 Preliminaries
We start with some notations. For a set D we denote by P (D) the set of all
subsets of D, and by P0(D) the set of all nonempty subsets of D. By |D| we
denote the number of elements of D.
Throughout, N = {1, . . . , n} (n ∈ N) is the set of players. Subsets of N are
also called coalitions. We denote by A the set of alternatives. We fix a set
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T ⊆ P0(A). In the first part of the paper, A is finite and T = P0(A); later, A
can be infinite, endowed with a topology, and then T will be the collection of
nonempty closed subsets of A.
Definition 2.1. An effectivity function (for T ) is a map E : P (N) → P (T )
such that (i) P (∅) = ∅, (ii) A ∈ E(S) for every S ∈ P0(N), and (iii) E(N) = T .
An effectivity function E is monotonic if B ∈ E(S) implies B′ ∈ E(T ) for all
B,B′ ∈ T and S, T ∈ P0(N) such that B ⊆ B′ and S ⊆ T . An effectivity
function E is superadditive if B ∩ B′ ∈ E(S ∪ T ) for all B,B′ ∈ T and S, T ∈
P0(N) such that B ∈ E(S), B′ ∈ E(T ), and S ∩ T = ∅. By E we denote the set
of all monotonic and superadditive effectivity functions.
For E,F ∈ E define the operations ∩ and ∪ by
(E ∪ F )(S) = E(S) ∪ F (S)
(E ∩ F )(S) = E(S) ∩ F (S)
for all S ∈ P (N). The following result is well-known, and we omit its easy
proof.
Lemma 2.2. Let E,F ∈ E. Then E ∩ F ∈ E.
Note that E,F ∈ E does not imply E ∪F ∈ E since E ∪F is monotonic but not
necessarily superadditive.
The aim of this paper is to develop a class of power indices for effectivity func-
tions.
Definition 2.3. A power index is a map ϕ : E → RN with ∑i∈N ϕi(E) = 1.
With effectivity functions, simple games can be associated. A simple game is a
function v : 2N → {0, 1} satisfying v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all
S, T ∈ P (N) with S ⊆ T – the last property is called monotonicity. Coalitions
S with v(S) = 1 are winning, the other coalitions are losing. The Shapley value
Sh, also called Shapley-Shubik power index (Shapley, 1953; Shapley and Shubik,
1954), assigns to player i in a simple game v the number
Shi(v) =
∑
S∈P (N): i/∈S
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] .
For an effectivity function E ∈ E , a set of alternatives B ∈ T , and a coalition
S ∈ P (N) let
vEB(S) =
{
1 if B ∈ E(S)
0 otherwise.
(1)
Clearly, vEB is a simple game for each B ∈ T . In this game, a coalition is winning
exactly if it is effective for B.
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For two simple games v, w we define the simple games v ∨ w and v ∧ w by
(v ∨ w) (S) = max (v(S), w(S)) , and
(v ∧ w) (S) = min (v(S), w(S)) .
The following lemma, the proof of which is left to the reader, will be useful later
on.
Lemma 2.4. Let E,F be two effectivity functions. Then for all B ∈ T :(
vEB ∨ vFB
)
= vE∪FB , and(
vEB ∧ vFB
)
= vE∩FB .
Example 2.5. Recall the US Legislation example from the beginning. Let
N = {p} ∪ S ∪ H where p is the president, S contains the 100 members of
Senate, and H contains the 435 members of the House. Let A1 be the set of
outcomes that can be achieved by international treaties, A2 those that can be
achieved by Congressional-executive Agreements, A3 those that can be achieved
by Executive Agreements or Orders, and A4 those that can be achieved by
domestic laws. Then Legislation can be represented by the minimal effectivity
function E with
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A3 if p ∈ T,
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A4 if |T ∩ S| ≥ 67 and |T ∩H| ≥ 290,
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A1 ∪A3 if p ∈ T and |T ∩ S| ≥ 67,
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A2 ∪A3 ∪A4 if p ∈ T and |T ∩ S| ≥ 51
and |T ∩H| ≥ 218,
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A if p ∈ T and |T ∩ S| ≥ 67
and |T ∩H| ≥ 218,
A \ {a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A1 if |T ∩ S| ≥ 34,
A \ {a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A2 ∪A4 if |T ∩ S| ≥ 50 or |T ∩H| ≥ 218,
A \ {a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A if p ∈ T and (|T ∩ S| ≥ 34
or T ∩H ≥ 146) .
Note that this effectivity function is somewhat simplified as it ignores the ma-
jority leaders’ ability to schedule the consideration of a bill. The combination
of a Filibuster by a Senator (which can be broken by a majority of 60 Sena-
tors) together with a Pocket Veto by the President is covered by the last line
above.
3 Main axioms for power indices
The main condition that we will put on a power index ϕ is the following, which
was first formulated for a value on simple games by Dubey (1975).
Transfer Property For all E,F ∈ E such that E ∪ F ∈ E ,
ϕ (E ∪ F ) + ϕ (E ∩ F ) = ϕ(E) + ϕ(F ).
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Throughout, we will also impose anonymity. For a permutation pi of N and an
effectivity function E ∈ E , let piE ∈ E be defined by (piE)(pi(S)) = E(S) for all
S ∈ P (N).
Anonymity ϕi(E) = ϕpi(i)(piE) for every E ∈ E , every permutation pi of N ,
and every i ∈ N .
Next, we introduce two monotonicity conditions.
Monotonicity ϕi(E) ≤ ϕi(F ) for all E,F ∈ E and every i ∈ N such that
E(S) \ E(S \ {i}) ⊆ F (S) \ F (S \ {i}) for all S ∈ P (N).
Strong Monotonicity ϕi(E) ≤ ϕi(F ) for all E,F ∈ E and every i ∈ N such
that {a} ∈ E(S) \ E(S \ {i}) implies {a} ∈ F (S) \ F (S \ {i}) for all
S ∈ P (N) and all a ∈ A.
Monotonicity states that if in one effectivity function a player contributes more
than in another one, then in the former that player should be attributed more
power than in the latter. Strong monotonicity weakens the premise of mono-
tonicity by requiring a player only to contribute more as far as single alternatives
are concerned, and thus results in a stronger axiom. An effectivity function may,
for instance, represent the ability of coalitions to keep the social state within a
certain range. However, when measuring power it might be more relevant to ask
which (single) social states a coalition can achieve, than to which social states a
coalition can reduce the outcome. For instance, a party’s power in a parliament
may be reflected by its ability to pass specific bills. In the effectivity function in
Example 2.5 this would mean that the last three cases do not add to the power
of any Congressmen. This idea is reflected by strong monotonicity instead of
just monotonicity.
Call a player i ∈ N a null player in E ∈ E if E(S) \ E(S \ {i}) = ∅ for all
S ∈ P (N). Note that in particular E(N \ {i}) = T if i is a null player in E.
The final condition we introduce in this section is as follows.
Null Player ϕi(E) = 0 for every E ∈ E and every null player i in E.
4 Finitely many alternatives
Throughout this section we assume that A is finite and that T = P0(A). Our
main result is the characterization of the set of all power indices satisfying the
Transfer Property, Anonymity, and Monotonicity. We start with some prelimi-
nary results.
For B ∈ P (A) we denote B+ = {B′ ∈ P0(A) : B ⊆ B′}. For an effectivity
function E ∈ E and a set B ∈ P0(A) we define
EB(S) =

P0(A) if S = N
B+ if B ∈ E(S)
{A} if B /∈ E(S) and S 6= ∅
∅ if S = ∅.
(2)
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Clearly, EB ∈ E for each B ∈ P0(A). We also have the following result about
unions of effectivity functions EB .
Lemma 4.1. Let E ∈ E and let ∅ 6= K ⊆ P0(A) such that B ∩ B′ ∈ K for all
B,B′ ∈ K. Then F = ⋃B∈K EB ∈ E.
Proof. Clearly, F is monotonic. For superadditivity, let S, T ∈ P0(N) with
S ∩ T = ∅, X ∈ F (S), Y ∈ F (T ). Then there are B,B′ ∈ K such that
B ⊆ X, B′ ⊆ Y , B ∈ E(S), and B′ ∈ E(T ). By superadditivity of E we have
B∩B′ ∈ E(S∪T ), and B∩B′ ∈ K since K is closed under intersection. Hence,
X ∩ Y ∈ F (S ∪ T ). 
An elementary effectivity function is an effectivity function of the form
UBT (S) =

P0(A) if S = N
B+ if S ⊇ T, S 6= ∅, and S 6= N
{A} if S + T and S 6= ∅
∅ if S = ∅
for some B ∈ P (A) and T ∈ P (N). Clearly, UBT ∈ E for all B ∈ P (A) and
T ∈ P (N). We now show that under the Transfer Property a power index ϕ is
completely determined by its values on elementary effectivity functions.
Lemma 4.2. Let ϕ and ψ be power indices satisfying the Transfer Property and
let ϕ
(
UBS
)
= ψ
(
UBS
)
for all B ∈ P (A) and all S ∈ P (N). Then ϕ = ψ.
Proof. Note that any E ∈ E can be written as E = ∪B∈P0(A)EB . Hence, to
prove that ϕ = ψ, it is sufficient to prove that ϕ(∪B∈KEB) = ψ(∪B∈KEB)
for every ∅ 6= K ⊆ P0(A) which is closed under intersection. We prove this by
induction on k = |K|. First let k = 1, say K = {B}, and write E = EB =
∪j∈IUBSj , where I ⊆ N with |I| ≤ 2n and {Sj ∈ P0(N) : j ∈ I} is the set of those
coalitions Sj that are minimally effective for B, i.e., B ∈ E(Sj) but B /∈ E(T )
for all T ( Sj . Then
ϕ(E) =
∑
∅6=J⊆I
(−1)|J|+1ϕ
⋂
j∈J
UBSj
 = ∑
∅6=J⊆I
(−1)|J|+1ϕ
(
UB⋃
j∈J Sj
)
=
∑
∅6=J⊆I
(−1)|J|+1ψ
(
UB⋃
j∈J Sj
)
=
∑
∅6=J⊆I
(−1)|J|+1ψ
⋂
j∈J
UBSj

= ψ(E)
where the first and fifth equalities follow from Lemma A.1 in the Appendix.
Now let kˆ ≥ 2 and suppose that ϕ (⋃B∈K EB) = ψ (⋃B∈K EB) for every K
with |K| = k < kˆ. Take K̂ with
∣∣∣K̂∣∣∣ = kˆ and let B̂ ∈ K̂ be a set of maximal
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cardinality. Let F =
⋃
B∈K̂ E
B . Then by the Transfer Property and Lemmas 2.2
and 4.1 we have
ϕ(F ) = ϕ
 ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB
+ ϕ(EB̂)− ϕ
 ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB
 ∩ EB̂

= ϕ
 ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB
+ ϕ(EB̂)− ϕ
 ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB∪B̂
 .
Thus, by the induction hypothesis,
ϕ(F ) = ψ
 ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB
+ ψ (EB̂)− ψ
 ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB∪B̂
 = ψ(F ),
completing the proof. 
The following lemmas state some consequences of Anonymity and Monotonicity
for the power index ϕ.
Lemma 4.3. Let ϕ satisfy Monotonicity. Then ϕj
(
UBS
)
= ϕj
(
UBT
)
for all
B ∈ P (A), all S, T ∈ P (N) and all j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ).
Proof. Let R ⊆ N and j ∈ R, j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ). Then
UBS (R) \ UBS (R \ {j}) =

{A} if R = {j}
∅ if R 6= {j} and R 6= N
P0(A) \B+ if R = N
= UBT (R) \ UBT (R \ {j}).
Hence ϕj
(
UBS
)
= ϕj
(
UBT
)
by monotonicity. 
The proof of the following lemma is obvious and therefore omitted.
Lemma 4.4. Let ϕ satisfy Anonymity. Then ϕi
(
UBS
)
= ϕj
(
UBT
)
for all B ∈
P (A), all S, T ∈ P (N) with |S| = |T | and all i ∈ S and j ∈ T .
A weight system is a collection ω =
(
ωB
)
B∈P0(A) of real numbers such that∑
B∈P0(A) ω
B = 1. Call a weight system ω non-negative if ωB ≥ 0 for all
B ⊆ A. For a weight system ω we define the power index Φω by
Φω(E) =
∑
B∈P0(A)
ωBSh
(
vEB
)
for every E ∈ E . The main result of this section is as follows.
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Theorem 4.5. A power index ϕ satisfies the Transfer Property, Anonymity,
and Monotonicity if and only if there is a non-negative weight system ω such
that ϕ = Φω. Moreover, for any weight systems ω and ω′, Φω = Φω
′
implies
ω = ω′.
Proof. We leave it to the reader to verify that Φω satisfies the Transfer Prop-
erty, Anonymity, and Monotonicity for any non-negative weight system ω. Now
let ϕ be a power index with these three properties. By Lemma 4.2 it is suf-
ficient to prove that there is a weight system ω as in the theorem such that
ϕ
(
UBS
)
= Φω
(
UBS
)
for every S ∈ P (N) and B ∈ P (A).
Let ω be a weight system. If S = N then ϕi
(
UBS
)
= Φωi
(
UBS
)
= 1n for each
B ∈ P (A) and i ∈ N by Anonymity of ϕ and Φω. For S ∈ P (N) \ {N},
j ∈ N \ S, and B ∈ P (A) we have for E = UBS :
Φωj
(
UBS
)
=
∑
B′∈P0(A)
ωB
′
Shj
(
vEB′
)
=
∑
B′∈P0(A),B′ /∈B+
ωB
′
Shj
(
vEB′
)
+
∑
B′∈P0(A),B′∈B+
ωB
′
Shj
(
vEB′
)
=
∑
B′∈P0(A),B′ /∈B+
ωB
′
Shj
(
vEB′
)
+ Shj
(
vEA
)
=
∑
B′∈P0(A),B′ /∈B+
ωB
′
n
+
ωA
n
. (3)
(Here we have used that Shi
(
vEA
)
= 1n for every i ∈ N , and that Shj
(
vEB′
)
= 0
if E = UBS , B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}, B′ ∈ B+, and j ∈ N \ S.) On the other hand,
by Lemma 4.3, ϕj
(
UBS
)
does not depend on S (as long as j /∈ S), and by
Anonymity ϕ
(
UBS
)
is completely determined by ϕj
(
UBS
)
. We now first show
that the system of equations
ϕj
(
UBS
)
=
∑
B′∈P0(A),B′ /∈B+
ωB
′
n
+
ωA
n
, B ∈ P0(A) (4)
has a unique solution ω =
(
ωB
)
B∈P0(A). To show this, it is sufficient to show
that the
(
2|A| − 1) × (2|A| − 1) matrix M with rows and columns labelled by
the sets in P0(A) and with elements mB,C defined by
mB,C =

1 if B 6= A and C /∈ (B+ \ {A})
1 if B = A or C = A
0 in all other cases
has full rank. We may order the rows of M according to increasing size of B,
that is, if |B′| < |B| then row (mB,C)C∈P0(A) is below row (mB′,C)C∈P0(A). In
particular, the last row corresponds to A. We also let the last column correspond
to A, hence it has the form (mB,A)B∈P0(A). We fix the other columns by letting
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the diagonal elements, except the last one, be of the form mB,A\B (the last one
is mA,A). From these assumptions it follows, in particular, that B ∩ C 6= ∅
whenever mB,C is below the diagonal.
Next, we manipulate the rows of M by letting, for all B,C ∈ P0(A),
m˜B,C = mB,C +
∑
∅6=B′(B
(−1)|B|−|B′|mB′,C .
This way we obtain the matrix M˜ , and it is sufficient to prove that M˜ has full
rank. We consider three different types of elements mB,C of the original matrix
M .
(a) Suppose mB,C = 0. Then B,C 6= A and B ⊆ C and hence mB′,C = 0 for
all ∅ 6= B′ ( B, so that m˜B,C = mB,C = 0.
(b) Suppose mB,C = 1 and mB,C is below the diagonal of M . Then B ∩ (A \
C) 6= ∅ and B ∩ C 6= ∅. Now
m˜B,C = mB,C +
∑
∅6=B′(B
(−1)|B|−|B′|mB′,C
= mB,C +
∑
∅6=B′(B
(−1)|B|−|B′| −
∑
∅6=B′(B,B′⊆C
(−1)|B|−|B′|
= mB,C +
∑
B′(B
(−1)|B|−|B′| −
∑
B′(B,B′⊆C
(−1)|B|−|B′|
= 1 + (−1)−
∑
B′⊆B∩C
(−1)|B|−|B′|
= 1 + (−1) + 0 .
In the fourth equality we have used the fact that B∩C 6= ∅. (Furthermore,
we have used that
∑`
k=0(−1)k
(
`
k
)
= 0.)
(c) Finally, consider a diagonal element mB,A\B with B 6= A. Then
m˜B,A\B = mB,A\B +
∑
∅6=B′(B
(−1)|B|−|B′|mB′,A\B
= 1 +
∑
∅6=B′(B
(−1)|B|−|B′|
= 1 + 0− (−1)|B| − (−1)0
= ±1 .
In particular, m˜B,A\B 6= 0 for every B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}. By exactly the
same argument (replace A \B by A) it follows that m˜A,A 6= 0.
From (a)–(c) we conclude that M˜ is an upper triangular matrix with non-zero
diagonal elements and thus has full rank. Therefore, the system of equations
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(4) has a unique solution ω = (ωB)B∈P0(A). We next show that the numbers
ωB sum to 1, as follows. For every i ∈ N , by (3), ϕi(UA∅ ) =
∑
B∈P0(A)
ωB
n , and
by summing over i ∈ N we obtain n∑B∈P0(A) ωBn = 1.
Non-negativity of ω is implied by Monotonicity of ϕ as follows. Suppose, to
the contrary, that ωB < 0 for some B ∈ P0(A). Let S ∈ P0(N) \ {N} and let
i ∈ N \ S. Let E = ⋃B′!B UB′S and let F = UBS . Then E,F ∈ E , and for
T ⊆ N with i ∈ T ,
E(T ) \ E(T \ {i}) =

{A} if T = {i}
(P0(A) \B+) ∪ {B} if T = N
∅ otherwise
and
F (T ) \ F (T \ {i}) =

{A} if T = {i}
P0(A) \B+ if T = N
∅ otherwise.
Therefore Monotonicity of ϕ implies ϕi(F ) ≤ ϕi(E). On the other hand, by (4),
ϕi(F ) =
∑
B′∈P0(A): B′ /∈B+
ωB
′
n
+
ωA
n
and
ϕi(E) = Φ
ω(E)
=
∑
B′∈P0(A)
ωB
′
Shi
(
vEB′
)
=
∑
B′∈P0(A): B′ /∈B+
ωB
′
Shi
(
vEB′
)
+
∑
B′∈P0(A): B′∈B+,B′ 6=B
ωB
′
Shi
(
vEB′
)
+ ωBShi
(
vEB
)
=
∑
B′∈P0(A): B′ /∈B+
ωB
′
n
+
ωA
n
+
ωB
n
< ϕi(F )
which is a contradiction. Hence, ω is non-negative. The last claim in the
theorem follows by unicity of ω as proved above. 
In the remainder of this section we consider further properties of power indices
of the form Φω.
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4.1 Connection with simple games
With a simple game v we can associate an effectivity function Ev in a natural
way by defining
Ev(S) =

P0(A) if v(S) = 1
{A} if v(S) = 0 and S 6= ∅
∅ if S = ∅.
Then vE
v
B = v for every B ∈ P0(A). From this the following result is straight-
forward.
Theorem 4.6. For every weight system ω and every simple game v, Φω(Ev) =
Sh(v).
Thus, for effectivity functions associated with simple games, Φω reduces to the
Shapley value for every weight system ω.
4.2 Dual games and polar effectivity functions
For a simple game v, the dual game is the game v∗ defined by v∗(S) = v(N)−
v(N \ S) for all S ∈ P (N). Note that v∗ is again a simple game (in particular,
it is monotonic).
For an effectivity function E ∈ E , the polar effectivity function is the effectivity
function E∗ defined by E∗(∅) = ∅ and E∗(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) : B ∩ B′ 6=
∅ for all B′ ∈ E(N \ S)}. Note that E∗ ∈ E .
The following results are easily established.
Theorem 4.7. Let E ∈ E. Then:
(a)
(
vEB
)∗
= vE
∗
A\B for all B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}.
(b)
(
vEA
)∗
= vF
∗
B for all B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}, where F ∈ E is defined by F (∅) = ∅
and F (S) = P0(A) for all S ∈ P0(N).
For a weight system ω define the weight system ω¯ by ω¯B = ωA\B for all
B ∈ P0(A) \ {A} and ω¯A = ωA. Then we have the following consequence
of Theorem 4.7.
Theorem 4.8. Φω(E) = Φω¯(E∗) for every E ∈ E and every weight system ω.
In particular, Φω(E) = Φω(E∗) if ωB = ωA\B for all B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}.
If an effectivity function is interpreted as describing what coalitions can guaran-
tee on their own, then the polar effectivity function describes what a coalition
cannot be kept from by its complement. Theorem 4.8 says that the power of a
player in an effectivity function is the same in its polar if we switch the weights
of sets of alternatives with those of their complements, in line with these inter-
pretations.
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4.3 Neutrality
For a permutation pi of A and E ∈ E , define Epi ∈ E by Epi(S) = {pi(B) : B ∈
E(S)}.
Neutrality ϕ(E) = ϕ(Epi) for every permutation pi of A and every E ∈ E .
We omit the easy proof of the following result.
Theorem 4.9. A power index ϕ satisfies the Transfer Property, Anonymity,
Monotonicity, and Neutrality if and only if there is a non-negative weight system
ω with ωB = ωB
′
for all B,B′ ∈ P0(A) with |B| = |B′|, such that ϕ = Φω.
4.4 Strong monotonicity
The premise of Strong Monotonicity is much weaker than the one of Monotonic-
ity: we are now comparing only a player’s (marginal) ability to enforce (single)
outcomes. As may be expected intuitively, for a power index Φω this condition
results in the weights of non-singleton but strict subsets of alternatives becoming
zero.
Theorem 4.10. Let A be a finite set. A power index ϕ satisfies the Transfer
Property, Anonymity, and Strong Monotonicity if and only if there is a non-
negative weight system ω with ωB = 0 for all B ∈ P (A) \ {A} with |B| ≥ 2,
such that ϕ = Φω.
Proof. Showing that a power index Φω as in the statement of the theorem
satisfies Strong Monotonicity (all the other axioms are satisfied by Theorem
4.5) is straightforward and omitted here. For the only-if direction, again by
Theorem 4.5, for a power index ϕ satisfying the three conditions there is a
weight system ω such that ϕ = Φω. For B ∈ P (A) \ {A} with |B| ≥ 2, i ∈ N ,
S ∈ P0(N), and a ∈ A we have that {a} ∈ UBS (T ) \ UBS (T \ {i}) if and only if
T = N . This is the case if and only if {a} ∈ UBN (T ) \ UBN (T \ {i}). Hence, by
Strong Monotonicity, Φωi
(
UBS
)
= Φωi
(
UBN
)
= 1n for all S ∈ P0(N), i ∈ N , and
B ∈ P (A) \ {A} with |B| ≥ 2. By (4) it then follows that ωB = 0 for all such
B. 
The next example provides an application of a strongly monotonic power index
to US legislation.
Example 4.11 (Example 2.5 continued). Recall that the Republicans have
simple majorities both in the Senate and in the House. This means that for
N = {R,D}, no singleton is effective for any {a} with a ∈ A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A4, but
{D} is effective for any {a} with a ∈ A3. Hence, as long as no party has a
two third majority in both chambers of Congress, the President’s party is more
powerful according to a power index in Theorem 4.10.
13
4.5 Null players
If we require that a power index of the form Φω additionally satisfies the Null
Player Property, then it must be the case that ωA = 0, since the simple game
vEA is the only game in the definition of Φ
ω in which a null player in E would
get a positive amount, namely 1n . This insight results in obvious corollaries of
Theorems 4.5–4.10 by adding the Null player Property. In the next section the
Null Player axiom will play a more prominent role.
5 Infinitely many alternatives
In this section we assume that A is a possibly infinite set, endowed with a
topology. More precisely, we assume that A is a T1-space, i.e. each set {a} with
a ∈ A is closed.1 The set of all nonempty closed subsets of A is denoted by T .
An effectivity function for T is defined as before, i.e. as in Definition 2.1.2
The set of monotonic and superadditive effectivity functions E is closed in the
following sense.3
Lemma 5.1. Let (Ek)k∈N be a sequence in E with E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ ... Then⋃
k∈NEk ∈ E.
Proof. Let E =
⋃
k∈NEk. Then E(S) =
⋃
k∈NEk(S) ⊆ T since Ek(S) ⊆ T for
all k ∈ N. Further E (∅) = ∅, A ∈ E(S) for all S ⊆ N and E (N) = T . Hence,
E is a topological effectivity function for T . Further, if T ⊆ S, B,B′ ∈ T with
B ⊆ B′ and B ∈ E(T ), then there is k ∈ N with B ∈ Ek(T ) and therefore
B′ ∈ Ek(S) by the monotonicity of Ek. Hence, B ∈ E(S), i.e. E is monotonic.
Finally, let B,B′ ∈ T and let S, T ⊆ N be nonempty and disjoint such that
B ∈ E(T ) and B′ ∈ E(S). Then there are k,m ∈ N such that B ∈ Ek(T ) and
B′ ∈ Em(S). In particular, B ∈ El(T ) and B′ ∈ El(S) for l = max{k,m}.
Hence, B ∩B′ ∈ El (S ∪ T ) ⊆ E (S ∪ T ), i.e. E is superadditive. 
For an effectivity function E and S ∈ P0(N) let ES be defined by
ES(T ) =

T if T = N
E(S) if T ⊇ S and T 6= N
{A} if T + S and T 6= ∅
∅ if T = ∅.
Then ES ∈ E for every E ∈ E and S ∈ P0(N). An effectivity function E ∈ E
may be decomposed in way that is related to the one in Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 5.2. Let E ∈ E and let I ⊆ P0(N) such that S′ ∈ I whenever there is
S ∈ I with S ⊆ S′, and let FI =
⋃
S∈I ES. Then FI ∈ E.
1Typical examples are topologies that are derived from a metric on A.
2Such an effectivity function is also sometimes called topological.
3Recall that for E ∈ E and S ∈ P0(N), E(S) is a collection of closed sets, and does not
need to be closed itself.
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Proof. Clearly, FI is an effectivity function. Let S ⊆ T and let B ∈ FI(S)
and B′ ∈ T with B ⊆ B′. Then there is S′ ∈ I such that B ∈ ES′(S).
Hence, B′ ∈ ES′(T ) by the monotonicity of ES′ , and therefore B′ ∈ FI(T ).
For superadditivity, let B,B′ ∈ T \ {A} (if either of these sets equals A, there
is nothing to show) and let S, T ⊆ N be nonempty and disjoint such that
B ∈ FI(S) and B′ ∈ FI(T ). Then there are S′, T ′ ∈ I such that B ∈ ES′(S) ⊆
E(S) and B′ ∈ ET ′(T ) ⊆ E(T ). In particular, since B,B′ 6= A, it must holds
that S′ ⊆ S and T ′ ⊆ T . Hence, B ∩ B′ ∈ E (S′ ∪ T ′) ⊆ E (S ∪ T ) by the
superadditivity of E. Since B ∩ B′ ∈ ES∪T (S ∪ T ), and since S ∪ T ∈ I, it
holds that B ∩B′ ∈ FI (S ∪ T ). 
This lemma implies the following one which is quite in the spirit of Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 5.3. Let ϕ and ψ be power indices satisfying the Transfer Property and
such that ϕ (ES) = ψ (ES) for all E ∈ E and all S ⊆ N . Then ϕ = ψ.
Proof. For any effectivity function E there is a set IE ⊆ P0(N) with S′ ∈ IE
whenever there is S ∈ IE with S ⊆ S′, such that E = FIE (with FIE defined
as in Lemma 5.2). If |IE | = 1, i.e. E = ES for some S, then ϕ (E) = ψ (E) by
assumption. Let |IE | ≥ 2 and let the claim be true for all effectivity functions
E′ with |IE′ | < |IE |. Let S ∈ IE be minimal. Then
ES ∩
 ⋃
T∈IE\{S}
ET
 = ⋃
T∈IE\{S}
(ET ∩ ES) =
⋃
T∈IE\{S}
E′T
where E′ = E ∩ ES is a monotonic and superadditive effectivity function by
Lemma 2.2. The set
{T : T ∈ IE \ {S}}
satisfies the condition of Lemma 5.2, hence ∪T∈IE\{S}E′T ∈ E . This means that
the Transfer Property applies and
ϕ
( ⋃
T∈IE
ET
)
= ϕ
ES ∪
 ⋃
T∈IE\{S}
ET

= ϕ (ES) + ϕ
 ⋃
T∈IE\{S}
ET
− ϕ
 ⋃
T∈IE\{S}
E′T

= ψ (ES) + ψ
 ⋃
T∈IE\{S}
ET
− ψ
 ⋃
T∈IE\{S}
E′T

= ψ
( ⋃
T∈IE
ET
)
.
by the induction hypothesis. 
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We introduce the following regularity condition.
Continuity For any sequence (Ek)k∈N of effectivity functions with E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆
. . . it holds that
ϕ
( ∞⋃
k=1
Ek
)
= lim
k→∞
ϕ (Ek) .
Note that the left hand side is well defined by Lemma 5.1. In case of a finite
set A, continuity is trivially satisfied by any power index.
For a probability measure µ on P (A) we define the map Φµ on E by
Φµi (E) =
∫
A
Shi(v
E
{a})dµ(a)
for every E ∈ E and i ∈ N . Clearly, ∑i∈N Φµi (E) = 1 for every E ∈ E(T ), so
that Φµ is a power index.4
Theorem 5.4. Let ϕ be a power index. Then ϕ satisfies the Transfer Property,
Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Continuity, and the Null Player Property if
and only if there is a probability measure µ such that ϕ = Φµ.
Proof. First, let µ be a probability measure on P (A). We show that Φµ sat-
isfies the five properties in the theorem. It is straightforward that Φµ satisfies
Anonymity; and since a null player in E ∈ E obtains 0 in every simple game
vE{a}, Φ
µ satisfies the Null Player Property. If E,F ∈ E and i ∈ N satisfy
the premise of Strong Monotonicity, then Shi(v
E
{a}) ≤ Shi(vF{a}) for all a ∈ A.
Hence, Φµ satisfies Strong Monotonicity.
To see that Φµ satisfies the Transfer Property, let E,F ∈ E with E ∪F ∈ E(T ).
Then
Φµ(E ∪ F ) =
∫
A
Shi(v
E∪F
{a} )dµ(a) =
∫
A
Shi(v
E
{a} ∨ vF{a})dµ(a)
=
∫
A
(
Shi(v
E
{a}) + Shi(v
F
{a})− Shi(vE{a} ∧ vF{a})
)
dµ(a)
= Φµ (E) + Φµ (F )− Φω (E ∩ F ) ,
where the second equality follows from Lemma 2.4 and the third one from the
Transfer Property of the Shapley value Dubey (1975).
For Continuity let (Ek)k∈N ⊆ E be an ascending sequence of effectivity functions.
Then for any S ⊆ N and any a ∈ A it holds that {a} ∈ ⋃∞k=1Ek (S) if and only
4Unless stated otherwise, we assume that probability measures are defined on the σ-field
P (A), i.e., the power set of A. Note, however, that all results in this section are also valid for
probability measures defined on the σ-field of Borel sets – i.e., the σ-field generated by the
topology on A.
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if v
⋃∞
k=1 Ek
a (S) = 1, or equivalently limk→∞ vEka (S) = 1. Therefore
Φµi
( ∞⋃
k=1
Ek
)
=
∫
A
Shi
(
v
⋃∞
k=1 Ek
a
)
dµ(a) =
∫
A
Shi
(
lim
k→∞
vEka
)
dµ(a)
=
∫
A
lim
k→∞
Shi
(
vEka
)
dµ(a) = lim
k→∞
Φµi (Ek)
by the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem as for all a ∈ A the integrand
Shi
(
vEka
)
is constant for sufficiently large k.
Suppose now that ϕ is a power index with the five properties in the theorem,
let S ∈ P0(N), let i ∈ N \ S, and define a function µ on P (A) by
µ(B) = 1− nϕi
(
E0 ∪
(⋃
b∈B
U
{b}
S
))
(5)
for all B ∈ P (A), where E0 is the effectivity function with E(S) = {A} for
all S 6= ∅, S 6= N . Note that µ is well defined since E0 ∪
(⋃
b∈B U
{b}
S
)
∈ E
and since, by Anonymity and Strong Monotonicity, the right hand side does not
depend on S ∈ P0(N) and i ∈ N , provided i /∈ S. We first show that µ is a
probability measure. Clearly,
µ(∅) = 1− nϕi
(
E0
)
= 1− n 1
n
= 0,
where the second equality follows by Anonymity. By Strong Monotonicity,
ϕi
(
E0 ∪⋃b∈B U{b}S ) ≤ ϕi (E0) for all i ∈ N \ S and all B ∈ P (A). Hence,
µ(B) ≥ 1− nϕi
(
E0
)
= 0.
Also, µ(A) = 1−nϕi
(⋃
b∈A U
{b}
S
)
= 1 since i /∈ S is a null player in ⋃b∈A U{b}S .
Further, for any two disjoint sets B,C ⊆ A it holds that
µ(B ∪ C) = 1− nϕi
( ⋃
b∈B∪C
U
{b}
S
)
= 1− n
(
ϕi
(⋃
b∈B
U
{b}
S
)
+ ϕi
(⋃
b∈C
U
{b}
S
)
− ϕi
(⋃
b∈B
⋃
c∈C
U
{b,c}
S
))
= 1− nϕi
(⋃
b∈B
U
{b}
S
)
− nϕi
(⋃
b∈C
U
{b}
S
)
+ n
1
n
= µ(B) + µ(C),
where the second equality follows from the Transfer Property and the third
equality follows from Strong Monotonicity applied to
⋃
b∈B
⋃
c∈C U
{b,c}
S and
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E0. Hence, µ is finitely additive. Further, for any sequence (Bk)k∈N with
B1 ⊆ B2 ⊆ . . . it holds that
µ
(⋃
k∈N
Bk
)
= 1− nϕi
(⋃
k∈N
( ⋃
b∈Bk
U
{b}
S
))
= 1− n lim
k→∞
ϕi
( ⋃
b∈Bk
U
{b}
S
)
= lim
k→∞
µ (Bk) .
This shows that µ is continuous from below, which together with finite additivity
implies that µ is σ-additive. Hence, µ is a probability measure.
In order to show that ϕ and Φµ coincide, note that for S ∈ P0(N) and i /∈ S we
have
ϕi
(⋃
b∈B
U
{b}
S
)
=
1
n
(1− µ(B)) = 1
n
µ(A \B)
=
∫
A\B
Shi
(
v
⋃
b∈B U
{b}
S
a
)
dµ(a) =
∫
A
Shi
(
v
⋃
b∈B U
{b}
S
a
)
dµ(a)
= Φµi
(⋃
b∈B
U
{b}
S
)
,
where the third equality follows from the fact that Shi
(
v
⋃
b∈B U
{b}
S
a
)
= 1n for
a ∈ A \ B; the fourth equality follows since Shi
(
v
∪b∈BU{b}S
a
)
= 0 for a ∈ B as
i /∈ S; and the last equality follows by definition of Φµ.
Let E ∈ E . For S ∈ P0(N), we have that
ϕ (ES) = ϕ
 ⋃
B∈E(S)
UBS
 = ϕ
 ⋃
B∈E(S):|B|=1
UBS

= Φµ
 ⋃
B∈E(S):|B|=1
UBS
 = Φµ (ES)
where the second and the last equality follow from Strong Monotonicity. By
Lemma 5.3 ϕ and Φµ coincide. 
Example 5.5 (Example 2.5 continued). We apply the power index in Theorem
5.4 to the legislative process from the introduction.5 Clearly, Shp(v
E
{a}) = 1 for
5Since strictly speaking the number of alternatives is finite here, this is also an application
of the results of Section 4, in particular 4.5.
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all a ∈ A3. For a ∈ A1 we have that all h ∈ H are null players and hence
Shs
(
vE{a}
)
=
33!67!
101!
(
99
66
)
≈ 6.634× 10−3,
Shp
(
vE{a}
)
≈ 0.3366.
For a ∈ A2 we have
Shs
(
vE{a}
)
=
(
99
50
) 435∑
k=218
(52 + k)−1
(
536
52 + k
)−1(
435
k
)
≈ 2.884× 10−3,
Shh
(
vE{a}
)
=
(
434
217
) 100∑
k=51
(219 + k)−1
(
536
219 + k
)−1(
100
k
)
≈ 5.429× 10−4,
Shp
(
vE{a}
)
≈ 0.4754.
For a ∈ A4 we have
Shs
(
vE{a}
)
=
(
99
50
) 435∑
k=218
(52 + k)−1
(
536
52 + k
)−1(
435
k
)
+
(
99
66
) 435∑
k=290
(67 + k)−1
(
536
67 + k
)−1(
435
k
)
≈ 4.374× 10−3
Shp
(
vE{a}
)
=
(
434
217
) 100∑
k=51
(219 + k)−1
(
536
219 + k
)−1(
100
k
)
+
(
435
289
) 100∑
k=67
(290 + k)−1
(
536
290 + k
)−1(
100
k
)
≈ 8.244× 10−4
Shp
(
vE{a}
)
≈ 0.204.
For the overall legislative process we therefore find
ϕs(E) =
1
1000
(6.634µ (A1) + 2.884µ (A2) + 4.374µ (A4))
ϕh(E) =
1
10000
(5.429µ (A2) + 8.244µ (A4))
ϕp(E) =
1
10
(3.366µ (A1) + 4.754µ (A2) + µ (A3) + 2.04µ (A4)) .
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5.1 An application of the infinite case: a spatial power
index
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) can be used as a measure of power of the
players in a simple game, where this simple game represents for instance the
political situation in a democratic parliament. In this case the Shapley value is
also called Shapley-Shubik power index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954). It sets the
power of a player equal to the probability that this player is pivotal (makes a
losing coalition winning) if coalitions are formed in a random order. This way
of measuring power, however, takes neither the issues at stake nor the positions
of the players (political parties) into account. Clearly, our approach improves
on this, as is exemplified by the case of US legislation above.
Political scientists often consider spatial models to remedy this defect (e.g.
Enelow and Hinich, 1984, 1990; Grofman et al., 1987). A well-known adap-
tation of the Shapley value to the spatial context is the Owen-Shapley spatial
power index (Owen and Shapley, 1989; Martin et al., 2014; Peters and Zarzuelo,
2016).
Here, we present a spatial power index, in the spirit of the Owen-Shapley spatial
power index, which is a power index of a topological effectivity function as in
Theorem 5.4. With some modification of our model also the Owen-Shapley
spatial power index can be obtained as a special case of a power index in this
theorem, as we will explain below (Remark 5.7).
As before, N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players. A simple game v (for N) is
proper if v(S) = 1 implies that v(N \ S) = 0 for each S ∈ P (N). Let k ∈ N,
k ≥ 2. A spatial game is a pair g = (v, p) where v is a proper simple game and
p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ (Rk)N with pi 6= pj whenever i 6= j, for all i, j ∈ N . Here,
pi ∈ Rk is the position of player i. Following Owen and Shapley (1989) we let
the set of issues A be represented by the unit sphere in Rk, i.e.,
A = {a ∈ Rk : ||a|| = 1} ,
where || · || is the Euclidean distance, and we interpret the inner product pi · a
as a measure of the attractiveness of issue a ∈ A for a player with position pi.
More precisely, we interpret the inequality pi · a ≤ pj · a as player i being more
in favor of issue a ∈ A than player j. For a spatial game g = (v, p) and an issue
a ∈ A we let Sg(a) ∈ P (N) be a minimal coalition such that v(Sg(a)) = 1 and
pi ·a ≤ pj ·a for all i ∈ S and j ∈ N \S. We assume that A is endowed with the
relative topology induced by the Euclidean topology on Rk. Clearly, Sg(a) is
unique for almost all a ∈ A. Thus, Sg(a) is the minimal winning coalition such
that all players in Sg(a) are more in favor of a than all players not in Sg(a). We
call S = Sg(a) minimal winning for a. For every coalition S ∈ P0(N) define
Ag(S) = {a ∈ A : S(a) = S}, and define λg(S) = λ(Ag(S))/λ(A), where λ(B) is
the Lebesgue measure of a subset B of A. In other words, λg(S) is the fraction
of issues for which the coalition S is minimal winning.6
6We assume that measures on A are defined with respect to Borel sets; note that all our
results above in Section 5 are valid for the σ-field of Borel sets instead of P (A).
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We now define the spatial power index Ω by
Ω(g) = Sh
 ∑
S∈P0(N)
λg(S)uS

for every spatial game g, where the simple game uS is the unanimity game for
S, i.e., uS(T ) = 1 if and only if S ⊆ T for all T ∈ P (N). Clearly, Ωi(g) ≥ 0 and∑
j∈N Ωj(g) = 1 for all g and i ∈ N .
Next, for a spatial game g = (v, p) we define Eg : P (N) → P (T ) as follows:
Eg(∅) = ∅ and for every S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ T , B ∈ Eg(S) if there is T ⊆ S
and a ∈ B such that T = Sg(a). Then Eg is monotonic by definition and
superadditive since v is proper. Let the probability measure µ on the Borel sets
B of A be defined by µ(B) = λ(B)/λ(A), i.e., µ is the uniform measure on A.
We then have:
Theorem 5.6. For every spatial game g = (v, p),
Ω(g) = Φµ (Eg) =
∫
A
Shi
(
v
Eg
{a}
)
dµ(a) .
Remark 5.7. The Owen-Shapley spatial power index O is based on a similar
construction as above. However, for each issue a ∈ A we say that the player
i ∈ Sg(a) with pj ·a ≤ pi ·a for all j ∈ S(a) is pivotal for a ∈ A. Then O assigns
to player i the fraction of all issues for which this player is pivotal. In other
words, all ‘power’ of the coalition S(a) accrues to the ‘last’ player to enter the
coalition. We can then, similarly, define an effectivity function based on player
i being effective for {a} whenever i is pivotal for a. Such an effectivity function,
however, is no longer superadditive. On the other hand, all our main results and
in particular Theorem 5.4 also hold without requiring superadditivity: in fact,
proofs in general become simpler since then the union of effectivity functions is
always an effectivity function. Thus, we obtain a result similar to Theorem 5.6
for the Owen-Shapley spatial power index, and Theorem 5.4 still applies.
A Lemma A.1
The following lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 4.3.
Lemma A.1. Let B ∈ P (A), let I ⊆ N with |I| ≤ 2|A|, and for each j ∈ I let
Sj ∈ P (N). Let E =
⋃
j∈I U
B
Sj
. Then E ∈ E and
ϕ(E) =
∑
∅6=J⊆I
(−1)|J|+1ϕ
⋂
j∈J
UBSj
 .
Proof. It is straightforward to check that E ∈ E . We prove the second state-
ment by induction on |I|. The statement obviously holds for |I| = 1. Let ` ≥ 2
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and suppose the statement is true when |I| < `. Let I = {1, . . . , `}. Then
ϕ(E) = ϕ
(
UBS1
)
+ ϕ
⋃`
j=2
UBSj
− ϕ
UBS1 ∩
⋃`
j=2
UBSj

= ϕ
(
UBS1
)
+
∑
∅6=J⊆{2,...,`}
(−1)|J|+1ϕ
⋂
j∈J
UBSj

−
∑
∅6=J⊆{2,...,`}
(−1)|J|+1ϕ
UBS1 ∩
⋂
j∈J
UBSj

=
∑
∅6=J⊆I
(−1)|J|+1ϕ
⋂
j∈J
UBSj
 ,
where the first equality follows from the transfer property and Lemma 2.2; the
second equality follows by induction; and the third equality follows by straight-
forward rewriting. 
B Independence of the axioms
The following lemma shows the independence of the axioms in Theorems 4.5,
4.9, and 4.10.
Lemma B.1. There are power indices ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4 such that
1. ϕ1 satisfies the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, but
not Neutrality;
2. ϕ2 satisfies the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Neutrality, but not Mono-
tonicity;
3. ϕ3 satisfies the Transfer Property, Strong Monotonicity, Neutrality, but
not Anonymity;
4. ϕ4 satisfies Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Neutrality, but not the Trans-
fer Property.
Proof.
1. Let ϕ1 = Φω where ω is a non-negative weight system satisfying ωB = 0
for all B ⊆ A with |B| ≥ 2 and ω{a} 6= ω{b} for some a 6= b. Then ϕ1 has
the desired properties by Theorem 4.10, and ϕ1 is not neutral by Theorem
4.9.
2. Let ϕ2 = Φω where the weight system ω satisfies ωB = ωB
′
if |B| = |B′|,
ωB ≤ ωB′ if B′ ⊆ B, and ωB < 0 for some B ⊆ A. Then ϕ2 has the
desired properties but is not monotonic by (the proof of) Theorem 4.5
and by Theorem 4.9.
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3. Let α = (αi)i∈N be a vector of strictly positive and distinct real numbers
with
∑
i∈N αi = 1, and let Sh
α be the weighted Shapley value (Shapley,
1953a; Kalai and Samet, 1987). Then ϕ3(E) =
∑
a∈A
1
|A|Sh
α
(
vE{a}
)
sat-
isfies the Transfer Property, Strong Monotonicity, and Neutrality because
of the respective properties of the weighted Shapley value, and it is clear
that ϕ is not anonymous.
4. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, let Bz denote the normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index
(e.g. Owen, 1995), and let ϕ4(E) =
∑
a∈A ω
aBz
(
vE{a}
)
, where ω is a non-
negative weight system such that ωB = 0 for all B ⊆ A with |B| ≥ 2 and
ω{a} = 1|A| . Then ϕ
4 violates the Transfer Property but satisfies all the
other properties.

The independence of the Axioms in Theorems 4.5 and 4.10 follows from points
2–4; and the independence of the axioms in Theorem 4.9 follows from points
1–4 in Lemma B.1.
The next lemma shows that the axioms in Theorem 5.4 are independent.
Lemma B.2. There are power indices ϕ1, . . . , ϕ5 such that
1. ϕ1 satisfies Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Continuity, Null Player, but
not the Transfer Property;
2. ϕ2 satisfies the Transfer Property, Strong Monotonicity, Continuity, Null
Player, but not Anonymity;
3. ϕ3 satisfies the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Continuity, Null Player,
but not Strong Monotonicity;
4. ϕ4 satisfies the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Null
Player, but not Continuity;
5. ϕ5 satisfies the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Con-
tinuity, but not Null Player.
Proof.
1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let ϕ1(E) = ∫
A
Bz(vE{a})dµ(a) for every E ∈ E ,
where Bz is the Banzhaf-Coleman index as in Lemma B.1, and µ is a
probability measure on P (A).
2. Let ϕ2(E) =
∫
A
Shα(vE{a})dµ(a) for every E ∈ E , where Shα is a weighted
Shapley value with all weights distinct as in Lemma B.1, and µ is a prob-
ability measure on P (A).
3. Let µ be a (signed) measure on A with µ(A) = 1 and µ(B) < 0 for some
B ∈ P (A). Then let ϕ3(E) = ∫
A
Sh(vE{a})dµ(a) for every E ∈ E .
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4. Let ϕ4(E) =
∫
A
Sh(vE{a})dµ(a) for every E ∈ E , where A = [0,∞) and
µ(B) = limk→∞ 1k · λ(B ∩ (0, k)) for every Borel set B of A, where λ
is the Lebesgue measure. Observe that µ is finitely additive but not σ-
additive, but the integral is still well-defined since the integrand takes only
finitely many values. Now ϕ4 satisfies all axioms except CO by the proof
of Theorem 5.4.
5. Let ϕ5i (E) =
1
n for every i ∈ N .

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